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We study the pass-through of wholesale price changes onto regular retail prices using an unusually detailed
dataset obtained from a major retailer. We model pass-through as a two-stage decision process that considers
both whether and how much to change the regular retail price. We show that pass-through is strongly
asymmetric with respect to wholesale price increases versus decreases. Wholesale price increases are passed
through to regular retail prices 70% of the time while wholesale price decreases are passed through only 9%
of the time. Pass-through is also asymmetric with respect to the magnitude of the wholesale price change,
with the magnitude a↵ecting only the response to wholesale price increases but not decreases. Finally, we
show that covariates such as private label versus national brand, ninety-nine cent price endings, and the
time since the last wholesale price change have a much stronger impact on the first stage of the decision
process (i.e., whether to change the regular retail price) than the second stage (i.e., how much to change the
regular retail price).
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1. Introduction
How retail prices adjust to wholesale price changes is of fundamental interest to both
practitioners and academics. Brand managers want to understand how changes in wholesale
prices a↵ect downstream retail prices, while academics have made price pass-through a
cornerstone of theory in both marketing (Tyagi 1999) and economics (Bils and Klenow
2004, Eichenbaum et al. 2011, Nakamura and Steinsson 2008). Despite the importance of
retail price pass-through, the empirical literature is scant. In this paper, we use a novel
dataset that consists of 11,852 wholesale price change events faced by a very large national
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retailer to study regular retail price pass-through. We develop a flexible statistical model
that allows for a rich characterization of how managers adjust the regular retail price in
response to a wholesale price change.
We find that, following 44% of wholesale price changes, managers make no change to
the regular retail price. Further, we find that their response is strongly asymmetric with
respect to wholesale price increases versus decreases. Wholesale price increases result in
regular retail price increases 70% of the time while wholesale price decreases result in
regular retail price decreases only 9% of the time.
The large fraction of non-responses to wholesale price changes is broadly consistent
with menu cost models of price adjustments (Barro 1972, Sheshinski and Weiss 1977).
These models argue that changing prices is costly and therefore managers will not respond
to every wholesale price change. If a firm faces menu costs and managers believe that
future wholesale price changes are more likely to be increases rather than decreases, then
menu cost models can also explain the asymmetric response we observe (Laurence and
Mankiw 1994). Expected future wholesale price increases would negate at least partially
any windfall arising from a current wholesale price decrease. On the other hand, they would
exacerbate the e↵ects of a current wholesale price increase. Thus, an extension of the menu
cost model is consistent with an asymmetric response.
Empirically, the large fraction of non-responses suggests that retail pass-through is best
characterized as a two-stage decision process: managers first decide whether to change
the regular retail price, and then, conditional on this decision, they decide the magnitude
of the price change. To our knowledge, other empirical models of pass-through have not
considered this two-stage process (Besanko et al. 2005, Nijs et al. 2010, Gopinath and
Itskhoki 2010).
When we consider the magnitude of pass-through, we also find tremendous asymmetry.
When managers increase the regular retail price following a wholesale price increase, the
increase in the regular retail price is a roughly linear function of the increase in the whole-
sale price. However, when they respond to a wholesale price decrease, the regular retail
price adjustment is uncorrelated with the magnitude of the wholesale price decrease.
When we examine the magnitude of the regular retail price increase in response to a
wholesale price increase, we find that pass-through generally exceeds 100%. More specifi-
cally, the dollar increase in the regular retail price is greater than the dollar increase in the
Author: Decision Stages and Asymmetries in Regular Retail Price Pass-through
Article submitted to Marketing Science; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) 3
wholesale price in 96% of cases where managers decide to pass a wholesale price increase
through to the regular retail price. Thus, pass-through that exceeds 100% is the norm
rather than the exception in our data. Relatedly, we show that small regular retail price
increases are rare events: when the regular retail price does increase, the change tends to
exceed 5% of the prior retail price even for marginal increases in the wholesale price.
Theoretical models of pass-through suggest that the magnitude of the price adjustment
should be influenced by factors such as the wholesale price (Besanko et al. 2005, Nijs et al.
2010), the shape of the demand curve (Tyagi 1999), competitive factors (Levy et al. 1998,
Slade and G.R.E.Q.A.M. 1998), and category management concerns (Zenor 1994, Basuroy
et al. 2001). We include covariates, such as the wholesale price, directly in our empirical
model and specify a very flexible model that can accommodate a wide variety of potential
managerial behaviors.
Overall, our two-stage model captures three key features of the data: (i) non-response
to wholesale price changes, (ii) asymmetry in both response incidence and magnitude,
and (iii) pass-through that exceeds 100%. Using out-of-sample data, we show that more
restrictive (e.g., single-stage) models of pass-through perform much more poorly than our
model.
We also compare our flexible model with managerial heuristics. First, we consider a
price maintenance policy under which the regular retail price always remains unchanged.
Second, we consider a percentage margin maintenance policy under which the regular retail
price after the wholesale price change is set so as to maintain the percentage margin in
place before the wholesale price change. Third, we consider a dollar margin maintenance
policy. The first heuristic clearly fails to explain the managerial response to wholesale price
changes while the latter two cannot explain the non-response. In sum, all three heuristics
perform quite poorly on the overall dataset. However, when we restrict our attention to an
important subset of the data, namely wholesale price increases that are followed by regular
retail price increases, the percentage margin maintenance rule performs reasonably well
and o↵ers a parsimonious explanation for why we observe pass-through rates that nearly
always exceed 100%.
Two additional heuristics we consider are hybrid policies that we refer to as minimum
percentage margin maintenance and minimum dollar margin maintenance. Under the min-
imum percentage (dollar) margin maintenance heuristic, managers seek to maintain per-
centage (dollar) margins at or above a target level. We assume that the current percentage
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(dollar) margin is the target. When faced with a wholesale price decrease, the margin
increases if regular retail prices are left unchanged and hence minimum percentage (dol-
lar) margin maintenance predicts non-response (i.e., it is equivalent to price maintenance).
When faced with a wholesale price increase, minimum percentage (dollar) margin mainte-
nance predicts that managers should always respond and increase the retail price so as to
maintain the percentage (dollar) margin (i.e., it is equivalent to percentage (dollar) margin
maintenance). We note that while the minimum percentage margin maintenance heuristic
does a good job at characterizing the non-response to wholesale price decreases as well as
the magnitude of the response to wholesale price increases, it cannot explain why managers
do not respond to 29% of the wholesale price increases in our data.
On the surface, it may appear that the heuristics that we consider are non-rational.
However, the percentage margin maintenance heuristic is identical to the widely applied
monopoly mark-up pricing rule. Under this rule, the price is proportional to marginal
cost times a markup that is a function of demand elasticity. Faced with a wholesale price
increase, the mark-up rule implies that managers should use the same percentage markup.
We note that percentage margins vary widely among categories and items, which suggests
that managers are not using a single, na¨ıve markup rule to price all items in the store.
We also note that this rule may not be fully rational as it ignores competitive factors and
other considerations such as product line e↵ects.
Our analysis explicitly focuses on regular retail prices and excludes promoted prices. We
believe that there are several factors that make our focus on regular retail prices appro-
priate. First, unlike promoted prices, regular retail price changes are persistent: a single
regular retail price change event has implications for many subsequent periods (Kehoe and
Midrigan 2015; forthcoming). Second, most revenue is earned at the regular retail price. In
particular, transactions at the regular retail price account for 77% of this retailer’s total
revenue. Although the proportion of revenue generated at the regular price varies across
SKUs, it is generally quite high: 61% of SKUs generate over 90% of their revenue at the
regular retail price while 77% of SKUs generate over 80% of their revenue at the regular
retail price. Similar facts hold for the unit volume at the regular retail price. Transactions
at the regular retail price account for 70% of this retailer’s unit volume with most SKUs
having a large amount of volume at the regular retail price: 49% of SKUs generate over
90% of their unit volume at the regular retail price while 67% of SKUs generate over 80%
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of their unit volume at the regular retail price. Consequently, potential changes to the
regular retail price are very high-profile decisions and are carefully scrutinized by senior
management (see Section 3.1 for details).
We believe our focus on regular retail prices (and exclusion of promoted priced) helps
explain why some of our findings conflict with prior empirical results. Given that managers
treat regular and promoted prices di↵erently, we would expect di↵erent results. We also
believe the unparalleled breadth of our dataset helps explain these conflicts. We have a
census of pricing decisions across a wide range of categories and products. Finally, we
believe our extremely high-quality data also helps explain any conflict. We observe discrete
wholesale price change events along with the actual managerial decision about whether
and how much to respond to the wholesale price change. Thus, we measure pass-through
directly from these observations. Most previous studies have had to infer pass-through from
patterns in historical data, which may introduce considerable noise. As a final comment, we
note our data allows us to build a multi-stage model of pass-through; the data considered
in previous studies have typically limited researchers to single-stage models of pass-through
whereas the multi-stage model we consider yields many new results.
Because we focus on the regular retail price, our study should not be interpreted as
either a comparison of regular and promoted pass-through rates or a criticism of studies of
promoted price pass-through. Instead, we remain silent on the issue of promoted price pass-
through. Additionally, we note a limitation of our study is that our data come from a single
retailer, which is common among studies that analyze detailed proprietary data. Acquiring
such data requires building a close relationship with a retailer, and the e↵ort required to
establish these relationships makes it unrealistic to analyze data from multiple retailers.
Although our data is from a single retailer discussions with managers and merchants at
the firm reveals an organizational structure and pricing processes that are typical of other
consumer packaged goods retailers such as supermarkets, drug stores, mass merchandisers,
and convenience stores. Across all SKUs in the store, the median (mean) regular retail price
is $6.04 ($9.07) while the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles are $3.64 and $10.19
respectively. The retailer follows a Hi-Lo pricing policy with a median (mean) promotion
depth of 27% (29%) while the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles are 20% and 37%
respectively. We believe our findings would generalize to other consumer packaged goods
retailers that sell products in a similar price range.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the extant literature in
Section 2. We then discuss institutional details, describe our unique dataset, and perform
some exploratory analyses in Section 3. In Sections 4-5, we describe our model for regular
retail price pass-through and discuss our results respectively. Finally, in Section 6, we
discuss the implications of our work.
2. Literature Review
Our paper contributes to three broad literatures in marketing and economics: price pass-
through, menu costs, and managerial rules. We discuss each of these and our contribution
to them in turn.
Several empirical papers have investigated price pass-through in the consumer packaged
goods industry, beginning with the seminal work of Chevalier and Curhan (1976) who
observe (i) zero pass-through on a substantial fraction of trade promotions, (ii) average
overall pass-through of 35%, and (ii) average pass-through of 126% excluding the zero pass-
through events. While our empirical approach di↵ers, our results are similar in that we
find, for example, a substantial fraction of zero pass-through events and that average pass-
through exceeds 100% when regular retail prices are increased in response to a wholesale
price increase.
A major challenge in estimating pass-through is obtaining accurate cost data and,
broadly speaking, there have been three approaches in the literature: working closely with
a single firm, using aggregate data, or building a structural model. The first approach was
used by Nijs et al. (2010), who worked closely with a single manufacturer to obtain detailed
cost data throughout the manufacturer’s vertical channel thereby allowing for the study
of pass-through across multiple layers of the channel. They find that pass-through from
wholesalers to retailers averages 106%. They also find that pass-through from retailers
to consumers averages 69%, which is similar to the estimates reported by Besanko et al.
(2005) and Pauwels (2007) for a broader set of product categories within the Dominick’s
Finer Foods retail chain.
The aggregate data approach to estimating pass-through was employed by Ailawadi
and Harlam (2009) who examined the annual pass-through of trade promotion dollars. In
particular, they calculated the annual total dollars spent by the manufacturer in the form
of trade promotions and divided this by the annual dollars spent by the retailer in the form
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of temporary price discounts to obtain an overall annual measure of pass-through. Under
this approach, Ailawadi and Harlam (2009) found that (i) 20% 35% of observations have
zero pass-through of trade promotion dollars and (ii) there is substantial heterogeneity
in annual trade promotion dollars pass-through across categories with several categories
showing annual pass-through in excess of 100%.
Finally, a structural modeling approach to estimating pass-through was used by Meza
and Sudhir (2006) who investigated the timing of pass-through. They found that retailers
tend to pass through a smaller amount in peak demand periods but that pass-through for
loss leaders exceeds 160% in non-peak demand periods.
Given both the di culty of empirically measuring pass-through and the variety of
approaches used to do so, it is perhaps not surprising that there is considerable controversy
over some findings. For example, a key finding of Besanko et al. (2005) is that discounts
o↵ered on one brand may a↵ect the prices o↵ered on competing brands, an e↵ect termed
cross-brand pass-through. This e↵ect has also been studied in a specific case by Anderson
et al. (2013) who find that a retailer adjusts the private label price when a national brand
is promoted. While there is some support for this concept of cross-brand pass-through, the
empirical evidence is mixed as both McAlister (2007) and Duan et al. (2011) find little to
no evidence of it.
In addition to the empirical literature on pass-through, there is also a considerable the-
oretical literature (Tyagi 1999, Moorthy 2005) that focuses on the derivative of the retail
price with respect to the wholesale price. Tyagi (1999) characterizes conditions (e.g., prop-
erties of the demand function) that lead to pass-through that is greater than or less than
100% while Moorthy (2005) generalizes these findings to include cross-brand pass-through
showing that it can be positive or negative. Our paper complements these theoretical
papers by providing empirical evidence that pass-through is a two-stage rather than one-
stage process; this suggests that new theoretical models of pass-through may need to be
developed in order to explore the theoretical implications of a two-stage decision process.
The two-stage decision process, while relatively unexamined in the marketing literature,
has been widely considered in the theoretical macroeconomics literature. For example,
menu costs, which impact whether to change prices but not how much to change them,
are often cited as a key source of price stickiness (Barro 1972, Sheshinski and Weiss 1977).
Despite the prominence of menu costs in theory, there is comparably less empirical evidence
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of them with notable exceptions being research on how managers set prices (Levy et al.
(1997), Levy et al. (1998), and Dutta et al. (1999)).
The paper is also related to work by two di↵erent (though overlapping) research teams
using data from the same retailer. The results of the first study are described in Anderson,
Simester, and Jaimovich (2015; forthcoming). They use a subset of the data used in this
paper and focus on the role of menu costs. In particular, they investigate whether a whole-
sale price increase is less likely to result in a regular retail price change if the menu costs of
changing regular retail prices are higher. Because they focus on the role of menu costs, they
only consider whether the regular retail price changes. In contrast, this paper considers
both whether and how much the regular retail price changes and employs a more flexible
statistical model. This allows us to characterize the asymmetric response to wholesale price
increases versus wholesale price decreases and variables that moderate both stages.
Work-in-progress by Anderson, Nakamura, Simester, and Steinsson (2014) uses a dif-
ferent sample of data from a di↵erent set of stores. They obtained data describing the
quantities purchased at both the regular retail price and at the discounted or promoted
price (if any). They combine this with unemployment data and commodity price data
to study the retail price response to demand or supply shocks. In particular, they study
whether the retailer responds to supply or demand shocks using regular retail prices or
promoted prices.
Another area of focus in the macroeconomics literature has been studying the e↵ects
of large-scale macroeconomic events such as recessions on retail margins, with early work
suggesting that retail margins may be counter-cyclical (Pigou 1927, Keynes 1939). Sev-
eral explanations have been o↵ered to explain this type of pricing behavior (Bils 1989,
Rotemberg and Saloner 1986, Greenwald et al. 1984). We contribute to this literature by
studying a time period that spans one of the largest recessionary periods in U.S. history
and observing how all retail prices within a chain are a↵ected. While retail managers face
an unprecedented number of wholesale price increases at the beginning of the recession
and a large number of wholesale price decreases soon thereafter, we find that their pricing
behavior is remarkably stable. In other words, retail managers do not seem to modify their
price setting behavior during the recession.
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3. Data and Exploratory Data Analysis
3.1. Institutional Details
We study the pricing behavior of a retailer that operates a large number of stores across the
United States and sells a broad mix of consumer packaged goods. Like many retailers, the
firm sells a mix of national brands and private label products. The private label products
typically carry the retailer’s name but are produced by either a contract manufacturer
or a national brand manufacturer. As noted earlier, a subset of this data is utilized by
Anderson et al. (2015; forthcoming) and additional details can be found in that paper.
To set the stage for our analysis, we briefly summarize important institutional facts
regarding the pricing process of consumer packaged goods manufacturers and retailers.
Many of these facts are also discussed in Anderson et al. (2014). First, nearly every major
consumer packaged goods manufacturer and retailer engage in some type of annual plan-
ning process that leads to a promotion calendar (Blattberg and Neslin 1990, p. 392).
Second, manufacturers establish trade promotion budgets that are used to fund price
discounts, in-store merchandising, and other retailer activities. Financial transfers from
manufacturers to retailers are somewhat flexible, which allows retailers to execute di↵er-
ent pricing policies (e.g., Hi-Lo versus EDLP). Third, manufacturers establish a wholesale
price, which is the long-run wholesale price for a product, and nearly every retailer faces
this same wholesale price. Fourth, changes in the wholesale price are infrequent events
and are often a↵ected by input costs, such as crude oil; these changes are unplanned, are
not part of the annual promotion calendar, and are highly disruptive to the supply chain,
which explains in part why they are so infrequent.
We now consider how these facts manifest themselves in our data. The retailer that
provided the data for our study maintains a wholesale price (or vendor list price) for every
product; this is viewed as the marginal cost of acquiring the product. The wholesale price
tends to be stable: only very infrequently does a manufacturer adjust the wholesale price
and then, in turn, the retailer decides whether to adjust the regular retail price. It is unusual
to change the wholesale price more than once a year and typically wholesale price changes
are announced thirty to sixty days in advance, although this varies by manufacturer. When
faced with a wholesale price change, the retail category manager and corporate pricing
team jointly determine the best response. If they decide to make a regular retail price
change, it is often coordinated with the wholesale price change so that both occur on the
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same day. These are very high-profile decisions that are carefully scrutinized by senior
management via a monthly report that summarizes the expected profit implications of the
decisions.
In contrast, price promotions, which are studied by Ailawadi and Harlam (2009) and Nijs
et al. (2010), are managed via an entirely di↵erent process at this retailer. Promoted price
changes often occur several times per year and are heavily influenced by trade promotion
funds. At the retailer we study, these financial flows are distinct from the wholesale price
and reside in a dedicated IT system. As we do not have access to these financial flows,
we do not have a measure of wholesale price for promotion and therefore cannot study
promoted price pass-through.
Given that there is some flexibility in the allocation of trade promotion funds, one
may be concerned whether changes in the wholesale price may a↵ect the depth or fre-
quency of trade promotions. Our conversations with many managers suggest that this is
very unlikely. Similar to industry norms, this retailer jointly plans price promotions with
manufacturers well in advance because they require tremendous coordination and lead-
time. In-store merchandising activities that generate demand (e.g., special displays, weekly
features, television advertising) must be coordinated with supply (e.g., inventory), and
promotions featured in store flyers each week are finalized at least twelve weeks in advance.
Canceling or changing a promotion at the last-minute is both di cult and costly. Given
these facts, we believe that the wholesale price change events that we observe in our data
have no immediate impact on promotions or temporary discounts. Additional research by
Anderson et al. (2014) on the same retail chain is consistent with this assumption.
One factor that may a↵ect the decision to change the regular retail price at this retail
chain is a capacity constraint on the number of price changes each day. This is analyzed
in detail by Anderson et al. (2015; forthcoming) who provide details on this policy. The
rationale for this capacity constraint is to avoid excessive use of in-store labor that is
required to change each regular retail price. For completeness, we also examine whether
this capacity constraint a↵ects whether and how much to pass through wholesale price
changes.
3.2. Data
Our data consist of n = 11,852 wholesale price change events faced by the retailer from
January 2006 through September 2009. For each event i, we observe four variables of
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Figure 1 Time Series of Prices for a Single SKU. Scanned prices change frequently relative to wholesale prices
and regular retail prices. Wholesale prices co-vary with regular retail prices but not scanned prices.
Observation of wholesale prices and regular retail prices allows us to model the managerial decision
process more accurately. We note that, while we observe these three time series for this single SKU, in
general we possess only the data described in Section 3.2 and indicated by the six points in the figure;
we also emphasize that this figure plots data for a single SKU and thus serves only for illustration.
principal interest: (i) c0,i, the wholesale price charged to the retailer by the manufacturer
before the wholesale price change; (ii) c1,i, the wholesale price charged to the retailer by
the manufacturer after the wholesale price change; (iii) p0,i, the regular retail price (i.e.,
shelf price) charged to consumers by the retailer before the wholesale price change; and
(iv) p1,i, the regular retail price charged to consumers by the retailer after the wholesale
price change.
An event in our data is an aggregate for all related flavors or variants of an SKU. For
example, the wholesale prices of all flavors of single serve Snapple always change at exactly
the same time. Thus, while Snapple may have many single serve SKUs (e.g., single serve
Lemon Iced Tea, single serve Raspberry Iced Tea, etc.), a change in the wholesale prices
of these SKUs constitutes a single event in our study. Unfortunately, we do not have data
on how wholesale price changes a↵ect other retailers. However, conversations with retail
managers suggest that competing retailers generally face the same wholesale price change.
For example, if the wholesale price of single serve Snapple changes at the retailer in our
study, then it is very likely that competing retailers also face a similar wholesale price
change.
To demonstrate how the price variables contained in our dataset have a number of
unique advantages relative to the data used in prior research, consider Figure 1, which
provides a time series of prices for a single SKU. Prior research (Besanko et al. 2005, Bils
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Variable 25% Median 75% Mean Std.Dev.
Market Share (Percent) 0.61 1.83 5.03 4.88 8.67
Promotion Frequency (Percent) 0.00 2.27 21.74 15.12 23.78
Promotion Depth (Percent) 0.00 20.40 48.07 25.10 26.01
Shelf Time (Days)? 795 1771 3890 2241.30 1638.74
Time Since Last
266 478 959 746.32 741.56
Wholesale Price Change (Days)?
Proliferation (No. of Brands)? 217 521 1254 739.96 601.71
Revenue (Dollars)? 221.37 550.24 1299.40 1288.86 2959.54
Number of Same Week
52 88 151 105.42 68.82
Wholesale Price Changes (Number)?
Table 1 Continuous Covariate Summary Statistics. Variables marked with a star enter into our model
logarithmically.
and Klenow 2004, Dube´ and Gupta 2008) has typically worked with the full time series of
scanned prices which, as demonstrated in the figure, is typically noisy. Our data contrasts
in two notable ways. First, we possess accurate observations of both the regular retail
price and the wholesale price; the wholesale price is the current base cost for the item
and is not confounded by trade promotions or adjustments for the historical price paid
for current inventory. Second, we isolate the points in time for which there is a change
in the wholesale price. More concretely, rather than working with the full time series of
scanned prices in the figure, we are able to work with the wholesale and regular retail
prices immediately before and after the wholesale price changes indicated by the points
in the figure. These observations allow us to model the managerial decision process more
accurately (see Sections 3.3 and 4 for details).
In addition to information about wholesale and regular retail prices, we observe several
auxiliary variables as well as ten covariates. Our auxiliary variables include: (i) SKUi, the
stock keeping unit associated with event i; (ii) d[i], the department of SKUi (e.g., beauty,
snacks, etc.); and (iii) the date associated with event i. Among our ten covariates, there are
two binary covariates, namely (i) whether SKUi is private label or national brand (24.9% of
all events are for private label SKUs) and (ii) whether or not p0,i ends in ninety-nine cents
(55.4% of all events are for SKUs with ninety-nine cent price endings). Finally, our eight
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Wholesale Price
Regular Retail Price
Decrease No Change Increase
Decrease 2.4% 22.7% 1.2%
Increase 0.4% 21.5% 51.7%
Table 2 Frequency of the Direction of Changes in Wholesale Price and Regular Retail Price. Decreases in the
wholesale price are less frequent and are more often followed by no change in regular retail price whereas
increases in the wholesale price are more frequent and more often followed by increases in regular retail price.
continuous covariates are: (i) market share, the dollar sales of SKUi in the ninety-days
prior to the wholesale price change divided by the dollar sales in the department of SKUi in
the ninety-days prior to the wholesale price change; (ii) promotion frequency, the number
of units of SKUi sold when SKUi is o↵ered at a promoted price in the ninety-days prior
to the wholesale price change divided by the total number of units sold in the ninety-days
prior to the wholesale price change; (iii) promotion depth, the average discount of SKUi on
days it is o↵ered at a promoted price in the ninety-days prior to the wholesale price change;
(iv) shelf time, the number of days between the date of event i and the date on which
SKUi was first sold by the retailer; (v) time since last wholesale price change, the number
of days between the date of event i and the date of the most recent prior wholesale price
change; (vi) proliferation, the number of brands o↵ered by the retailer in the department
to which SKUi belongs; (vii) revenue, the dollar sales of SKUi in the ninety-days prior to
the wholesale price change; and (viii) number of same week wholesale price changes, the
number of wholesale price changes across all SKUs occurring in the same week as event
i. We present summary statistics for these variables in Table 1. Of note is the relative
infrequency of wholesale price changes with the median (mean) time between such changes
being 478 (746) days.
3.3. Exploratory Data Analysis
Consider sci = sgn(c1,i   c0,i) and spi = sgn(p1,i   p0,i), the direction of the change in the
wholesale price and regular retail price associated with event i respectively, which we
summarize in Table 2. Nearly three-quarters of our observed wholesale price changes are
increases in the wholesale price and these wholesale price increases are typically followed by
increases in the regular retail price. Nonetheless, a large fraction of our observed wholesale
price increases are followed by no change in the regular retail price. On the other hand,
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about one-quarter of our observed wholesale price changes are decreases in the wholesale
price and these wholesale price decreases are typically followed by no change in the regular
retail price. This portends two features of the managerial decision-making process. First,
the large fraction of wholesale price change events with no change in the regular retail price
suggests managers may be adopting a two-stage approach in setting prices: after observing
a change in wholesale price, they first determine whether and in what direction to change
the regular retail price, and then they determine the magnitude of the change in regular
retail price. Second, the asymmetry of responses suggests managers may use a di↵erent
process when responding to wholesale price increases versus decreases.
Table 2 also shows a curious behavior: sometimes the retailer increases (decreases) the
regular retail price after a decrease (increase) in the wholesale price. We believe that
changes to the wholesale price prompt the retailer to re-evaluate their regular retail price,
and, consequently, they sometimes react in the unexpected (i.e., opposite sign) direction.
To more deeply examine the relationship between wholesale and regular retail price
changes, we plot the change in regular retail price (i.e., p1,i   p0,i) versus the change in
wholesale price (i.e, c1,i  c0,i) in Figure 2. The observations fall into two distinct groups,
a group of observations for which the change in the regular retail price is zero (and for
which the points lie on the y = 0 line in the plot) and a group of observations for which
the change in the regular retail price is non-zero (and which tend to be strongly positively
correlated with the wholesale price change).
Key features of the relationship between wholesale and regular retail price changes are
highlighted by the solid smoothing curve. First, there appears to be an asymmetric price
response: for wholesale price increases that are small to moderate the smooth curve overlaps
the gray 45  line while for wholesale price decreases the smooth curve is well above the
45  line. This suggests that managers might pass wholesale price increases through on a
one-to-one basis but that they decrease regular retail prices commensurately less when
faced with wholesale price decreases. Second, for relatively small decreases in wholesale
price, the smooth curve essentially lies on the y = 0 line suggesting that relatively small
decreases in wholesale prices are generally not passed through to consumers.
The solid smooth curve is fit to all observations and thus ignores a key feature of the
data, namely that the data falls into two distinct groups (i.e., those with zero and non-zero
changes in regular retails prices). By examining the curve alone, one cannot determine
Author: Decision Stages and Asymmetries in Regular Retail Price Pass-through
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Figure 2 Regular Retail Price Change versus Wholesale Price Change. The smooth curves provide the fit of a
generalized additive model with the degree of smoothness estimated from the data using all events
(solid curve) and excluding zero regular retail price change events (dashed curve) respectively. The gray
line is the 45  line. Excluding zero regular retail price change events results in a relatively symmetric
price response curve. Including zero regular retail price change events results in an asymmetric price
response curve: for wholesale price increases the smooth curve overlaps the 45  line while for wholesale
price decreases it is well above it. Axis values have been removed to protect confidentiality.
whether the price changes are a result of (i) a relatively smooth relationship between
wholesale price changes and regular retail price changes or (ii) a mixture of a relatively
smooth relationship between wholesale price changes and regular retail price changes with
a probability of no change in regular retail price that varies with the direction and size of
the change in wholesale price. The large number of data points on the y= 0 line suggest the
latter is indeed the case and thus we refit our smooth curve excluding these observations;
the resulting curve is the dashed curve and it di↵ers considerably from the solid one.
The dashed curve is relatively symmetric with respect to wholesale price decreases and
increases. Further, it lies beyond the 45  line suggesting that pass-through, when it occurs,
occurs on a greater than one-to-one basis. In sum, this suggests that the second explanation
Author: Decision Stages and Asymmetries in Regular Retail Price Pass-through
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Figure 3 Change in Margin by Direction of Wholesale Price Change. The distributions have large mass near zero
suggesting a margin maintenance policy while the distribution associated with wholesale price decreases
has more mass in the right tail due to the large fraction of observations with zero associated change
in regular retail price. Axis values have been removed to protect confidentiality.
mentioned in this paragraph is at play: (i) after observing a change in wholesale price,
managers choose whether and in what direction to change the regular retail price and this
decision is impacted by both the size and direction of the change in wholesale price; then
(ii) they determine the magnitude of the change in regular retail price in a manner which
may also depend on the size and direction of the change in wholesale price.
We define the retail percentage margin before and after the wholesale price change as
mj,i =
pj,i cj,i
pj,i
for j 2 {0,1} and the change in margin as m1,i m0,i, and we plot the changes
in margin conditional on the direction of the change in wholesale price in Figure 3. As
can be seen, both distributions feature a large mass near zero. This suggests that retailers
are setting prices in a manner that roughly maintains percentage margin. Nonetheless,
the distribution associated with wholesale price decreases has more mass in the right tail
because there is a large fraction of observations with zero associated change in regular
retail price, and a zero change in the regular retail price in combination with a decrease in
the wholesale price leads to a potentially large increase in margin.
We define pass-through elasticity as ei =
(p1,i p0,i)/p0,i
(c1,i c0,i)/c0,i and we plot the elasticities in Figure
4. The left panel provides the elasticities for the entire dataset. This distribution has mass at
zero reflecting the large number of observations with zero change in regular retail price; the
distribution with non-zero support is centered around one reflecting margin maintenance.
The right panels plot the elasticities by department for the top six departments in terms
Author: Decision Stages and Asymmetries in Regular Retail Price Pass-through
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(b) Top Six Departments
Figure 4 Pass-Through Elasticity. The left panel gives the distribution of pass-through elasticity for the entire
dataset. The distribution has mass at zero reflecting the large number of observations with no change in
the regular retail price; the distribution with non-zero support is centered around one. The right panels
give the distribution of pass-through elasticity for the six departments with the greatest number of
wholesale price changes. Di↵erent patterns of pass-through elasticity indicate department heterogeneity.
Department names have been removed to protect confidentiality.
of the number of wholesale price changes. There is considerable heterogeneity in shape
across departments. For instance, departments A, B, C, and F have a comparably large
mass at zero (i.e., no change in the regular retail price) while departments D and E have a
comparably smaller mass at zero. Further, departments A, B, and C seem to have a more
uniform distribution of the non-zero elasticities while departmentD has more mass between
zero and one and department E is more sharply peaked at one. These di↵erent patterns of
pass-through suggest considerable heterogeneity across departments, a key feature of our
model.
As a final consideration, we note that a salient feature of the data is an unprecedented
number of wholesale price increases in the second half of 2008 followed by a large number
of wholesale price decreases in the first half of 2009 and we believe that both are due to
the economic recession (Anderson et al. 2014). As managers are faced with an increasing
number of wholesale price change events in these time periods and, further, the relative
balance of wholesale price increases and decreases deviates strongly from the norm in these
time periods (the ratio of wholesale price increases to decreases is 2.5, 2.4, 7.4, and 1.3 and
for each year 2006 - 2009 respectively), one may wonder whether pass-through decisions
also deviate strongly from the norm. Consequently, our model allows for heterogeneity
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in pass-through across time; this allows us to detect whether pass-through decisions vary
along with the incidence and direction of wholesale price changes.
4. Model
We model p1,i, the regular retail price charged by the retailer after the wholesale price
change, as a function of c0,i, c1,i, p0,i, and Xi, the vector of ten covariates discuss in Section
3, using a two-stage, asymmetric Bayesian hierarchical model. The two-stage approach
allows us to account for key features of the data: the large fraction of wholesale price change
events with no change in the regular retail price (Table 2), asymmetry in both whether
and how much to change the regular retail price (Table 2 and Figure 2 respectively), and
di↵erent shapes for decreases versus increases in the wholesale price (Figures 2 and 3).
The basic form of our two-stage model is a multinomial logistic regression in the first
stage and a truncated regression in the second stage. The first stage models the direction
of the change in the regular retail price while the second models its magnitude; both stages
are asymmetric with respect to wholesale price increases versus decreases.
Before formally introducing our model, we introduce some basic principles for notation.
First, we let ↵ and   denote parameters for the first and second stage of our model respec-
tively. Second, we use superscripts to denote the various classes of our model parameters
(e.g., intercept, covariates, etc.). Third, parameters have subscripts that refer to direc-
tion of the wholesale price change and the regular retail price change; in cases where an
additional subscript is needed, its role will be clear from context.
In the first stage of our model, we model spi , the direction of the regular retail price
change. In particular, we let
log
✓
P(spi = k)
P(spi = 0)
◆
= ↵Interceptsci ,k +↵
Department
d[i],sci ,k
+↵T imet[i],sci ,k+ f
Price
↵,sci ,k
(c0,i, c1,i, p0,i)+X
0
i ↵
Covariate
sci ,k
for k 2 { 1,1} and where (i) ↵Interceptsci ,k is an intercept term for which k varies in the usual
multinomial logistic manner for the specification of the logarithm of the probability of a
regular retail price increase (k= 1) or decrease (k= 1) relative to no change (k= 0), (ii)
↵Departmentd[i],sci ,k
is a department-specific intercept term that depends on d[i], the department
of the SKUi, (iii) ↵T imet[i],sci ,k is a time-specific intercept term that depends on t[i], the week
of event i, (iv) fPrice↵,sci ,k is a function to be specified below, and (v) ↵
Covariate
sci ,k
is a vector of
coe cients that model the impact of our covariates Xi. These equations allow us to obtain
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pi = (P(spi = 1),P(spi = 0),P(spi = 1)) and we then let spi ⇠Multinomial(1,pi) with support
{ 1,0,1}.
In the second stage, we model p1,i, the regular retail price following the wholesale price
change conditional on the direction of the regular retail price change (i.e., conditional on
stage one of the model). In particular, we let
p1,i ⇠TruncatedNormal(µi, 2sci ,spi |li, ui).
The use of a truncated normal reflects the fact that, in the second stage, we know spi (i.e.,
whether the change in regular retail price was an increase, decrease, or no change) and,
thus, we can bound p1,i. In particular, when s
p
i = 1 (reflecting an increase in regular retail
price) we set the lower and upper bounds to li = p0,i and ui =1 respectively. Similarly,
when spi =  1 (reflecting a decrease in regular retail price) we set the lower and upper
bounds to li =  1 and ui = p0,i respectively. Finally, when spi = 0 (reflecting no change
in regular retail price) we set p1,i = µi = li = ui = p0,i and  sci ,0 = 0 reflecting no change in
regular retail price with probability one (which is true conditional on the first stage of the
model). Our specification for µi mirrors our specification for the relative log probabilities
above. In particular,
µi =  
Intercept
sci ,s
p
i
+ Department
d[i],sci ,s
p
i
+ T imet[i],sci ,s
p
i
+ fPrice ,sci ,s
p
i
(c0,i, c1,i, p0,i)+X
0
i  
Covariate
sci ,s
p
i
as above.
At the heart of our model lies the specification of (i) a hierarchical Bayesian prior
for ↵Department and  Department as well as ↵T ime and  T ime and (ii) a functional form for
fPrice ,j,k . We proceed by first discussing the former. The ↵
Department and  Department terms in
our model allow for heterogeneity across departments, an important feature as suggested
by Figure 4. We go beyond department-specific heterogeneity by also allowing the pass-
through decision to be heterogenous in time via the ↵T ime and  T ime terms. To define the
prior, let us first define
 Departmentd[i] = (↵
Department
d[i], 1, 1 ,↵
Department
d[i], 1,1 ,↵
Department
d[i],1, 1 ,↵
Department
d[i],1,1 ,
 Departmentd[i], 1, 1 , 
Department
d[i], 1,1 , 
Department
d[i],1, 1 , 
Department
d[i],1,1 )
 T imet[i] = (↵
T ime
t[i], 1, 1,↵
T ime
t[i], 1,1,↵
T ime
t[i],1, 1,↵
T ime
t[i],1,1, 
T ime
t[i], 1, 1, 
T ime
t[i], 1,1, 
T ime
t[i],1, 1, 
T ime
t[i],1,1)
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as the vectors of all eight department-specific and time-specific terms. We then use the
priors
 Departmentd ⇠MultivariateNormal(0,⌃Department) ,  T imet ⇠MultivariateNormal(0,⌃T ime)
where ⌃Department and ⌃T ime are arbitrary matrices thus implying a joint prior on the
respective elements of  Departmentd and  
T ime
t ; with this specification for ⌃
Department and
⌃T ime, the two stages of our model are linked not only by the fact that the second stage
is conditional on the first stage but also through the joint prior on the respective elements
of  Departmentd and  
T ime
t .
We now discuss the functional form of fPrice ,j,k . Prior literature has typically focused on
modeling the regular retail price as a function of the wholesale price (Besanko et al. 2005).
An advantage of our unique dataset is the ability to observe changes in both regular retail
prices and wholesale prices. Consequently, modeling the change in the regular retail price
as a function of the change in the wholesale price would be a natural analogue of prior
models. This model, (p1  p0)⇠  (c1  c0) implies p1 ⇠ p0   c0+  c1 which is a restricted
linear model with the coe cient on p0 fixed to one and the coe cients on c0 and c1 fixed
to be of the same magnitude but opposite in sign. Thus, our restricted linear specification
for fPrice ,j,k is
fPrice ,j,k (c0,i, c1,i, p0,i) =  Pricej,k,1 c0,i+  Pricej,k,1 c1,i+ p0,i
where   2 {↵, } and j, k 2 { 1,1}. This naturally suggests our second specification for
fPrice ,j,k which is simply the unrestricted linear specification
fPrice ,j,k (c0,i, c1,i, p0,i) =  
Price
j,k,1 c0,i+  
Price
j,k,2 c1,i+  
Price
j,k,3 p0,i.
Our third and final specification for fPrice ,j,k allows for a more flexible form, in particular a
response surface of order two
fPrice ,j,k (c0,i, c1,i, p0,i) = 
Price
j,k,1 c0,i+  
Price
j,k,2 c1,i+  
Price
j,k,3 p0,i
+  Pricej,k,4 c0,ic1,i+  
Price
j,k,5 c0,ip0,i+  
Price
j,k,6 c1,ip0,i
+  Pricej,k,7 c
2
0,i+  
Price
j,k,8 c
2
1,i+  
Price
j,k,9 p
2
0,i.
We explore these models in full in the next section.
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Given the likelihood presented in this section (i.e., the product of the multinomial dis-
tribution for stage one and the truncated normal distribution for stage two conditional on
stage one), all that remains to be specified are our priors for our parameters and hyper-
parameters. Simply put, we use standard ones for Bayesian hierarchical models; full details
can be found in Appendix A.
In addition to the principal model presented above, we consider two simplifications of
our model. First, we consider a version of the model that is symmetric with regards to
wholesale price increases versus decreases. This model is identical to that presented above
except that all model parameters with a subscript for the sign of the wholesale price change
(i.e., with a subscript sci) are set equal for s
c
i =  1 (i.e., wholesale price decrease) and
sci = 1 (i.e., wholesale price increase); in particular, we set ↵
Intercept
 1,spi = ↵
Intercept
1,spi
, ↵Department
d[i], 1,spi =
↵Department
d[i],1,spi
, and so on. Second, we also consider a one stage version of the model. This
model is identical to the second stage of the model presented above except that conditional
on the incidence or direction of the regular retail price change and thus uses a normal
distribution (as opposed to a truncated normal distribution) to model p1,i, the regular retail
price following the wholesale price change. In particular, we let p1,i ⇠Normal(µi, 2sci ) where
the specification for µi is as above but does not depend on the direction of the regular retail
price change (i.e., µi =  
Intercept
sci
+ Departmentd[i],sci
+ T imet[i],sci + f
Price
 ,sci
(c0,i, c1,i, p0,i)+X 0i  
Covariate
sci
).
5. Results
5.1. Model Evaluation
The key findings of our the paper are that (i) managers respond to a wholesale price
change by first deciding whether and in what direction to change the regular retail price
and then by deciding on the magnitude of the change and (ii) managers make these deci-
sions asymmetrically with respect to whether the wholesale price is increased or decreased.
Therefore, our analysis focuses on validating the claim that retail managers use a two-stage
asymmetric approach rather than one-stage or symmetric approaches when deciding how
to respond to wholesale price changes. To do so we will compare the twelve model specifi-
cations discussed in Section 4 (i.e., three specifications for f  crossed with the symmetric
versus asymmetric version of the model crossed with the one-stage versus two-stage version
of the model).
We compare these models both in-sample and out-of-sample. To assess in-sample fit, we
use the deviance information criterion (DIC) (Spiegelhalter et al. (2002)). Out-of-sample
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Stages Assymetry fPrice ,j,k
In-sample Out-of-Sample
DIC RMSE MAE Sign% Zero% Cov% Avg. Width
One No Restricted Linear 29454.6 0.95 0.19 51 0 96 3.67
One No Linear 29165.2 0.96 0.19 51 0 96 3.62
One No Response Surface 27419.4 0.81 0.18 51 0 96 3.34
One Yes Restricted Linear 24653.2 0.89 0.21 51 0 96 3.20
One Yes Linear 24258.4 0.88 0.20 51 0 96 3.14
One Yes Response Surface 22221.3 0.79 0.18 51 0 96 2.83
Two No Restricted Linear 19963.1 1.04 0.09 78 73 97 1.66
Two No Linear 19394.7 1.01 0.08 78 71 98 1.65
Two No Response Surface 18758.8 0.68 0.08 79 73 98 1.62
Two Yes Restricted Linear 17579.9 0.82 0.09 80 72 98 1.63
Two Yes Linear 17189.3 0.91 0.08 80 73 98 1.58
Two Yes Response Surface 16753.7 0.64 0.07 81 73 98 1.54
Price Maintenance NA 1.11 0.20 46 100 NA NA
Percentage Margin Maintenance NA 1.69 0.15 52 0 NA NA
Dollar Margin Maintenance NA 1.06 0.19 52 0 NA NA
Minimum Percentage Margin Maintenance NA 1.52 0.08 74 52 NA NA
Minimum Dollar Margin Maintenance NA 1.13 0.14 74 52 NA NA
Table 3: Model Evaluation Metrics for Various Model Specifications. DIC denotes deviance information criterion, RMSE root
mean square error, MAE median absolute error, Sign% the percentage of sign changes in the regular retail price correctly
forecast by the model, Zero% the percentage of zero regular retail price changes correctly forecast by the model, Cov% the
coverage percentage of the 95% predictive intervals, and Avg. Width the average width of the 95% predictive intervals. More
flexible models typically perform better and the most flexible one performs the best. The managerial heuristics generally
perform poorly except minimum percentage margin maintenance which is quite competitive in terms of MAE.
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fit is assessed using a holdout sample of 1,000 randomly selected observations, and we
compare model performance using six di↵erent metrics:
1. RMSE: Root mean square error.
2. MAE: Median absolute error.
3. Sign%: The percentage of sign changes in the regular retail price correctly forecast by
the model.
4. Zero%: The percentage of zero regular retail price changes correctly forecast by the
model.
5. Cov%: The coverage percentage of the 95% predictive intervals.
6. Avg. Width: The average width of the 95% predictive intervals.
Our findings are reported in Table 3. We see that the asymmetric two-stage models consis-
tently perform better than either the one-stage or symmetric models. This holds not just
for the in-sample metric but also the out-of-sample metrics where the larger number of
parameters associated with the most flexible asymmetric two-stage model could potentially
(but do not in practice) lead to over-fitting.
The relatively poor performance of the various models in comparison to the two-stage,
asymmetric model is not particularly surprising given the data presented in Table 2 and
Figure 2. First, Table 2 shows that nearly 45% of wholesale price changes are met with
no change in regular retail price. Thus, any model that does not allow for substantial
mass on this single outcome will provide a poor fit to our data. Consequently, one-stage
models (which necessarily place zero mass on this outcome) fare poorly in comparison to
two-stage models. Second, Table 2 reveals that managers make dramatically asymmetric
decisions about whether and in what direction to adjust regular retail prices: no change in
the regular retail price is much more likely for wholesale price decreases versus increases;
third, the smooth curves in Figure 2 suggest asymmetries in the magnitude of changes in
regular retail prices. In tandem, these two points means that symmetric models that do
not allow for this possibility fare poorly relative to asymmetric models. We conclude that
both in-sample and out-of-sample fit measures together with very obvious features of the
data call for a two-stage, asymmetric model.
We also evaluate our models relative to five managerial heuristics:
1. Price Maintenance: A policy under which the regular retail price always remains
unchanged. Formally, p1,i = p0,i.
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2. Percentage Margin Maintenance: A policy under which the regular retail price after
the wholesale price change is set so as to maintain the percentage margin in place
before the wholesale price change. As noted, this policy is equivalent to the monopoly
mark-up pricing rule. Formally, p1,i = p0,i
c1,i
c0,i
which is equivalent to p1,i =
✏0,i
1+✏0,i
c1,i where
the markup ✏0,i1+✏0,i is determined based on the mark-up prior to the wholesale price
change (i.e., ✏0,i = p0,i/(c0,i  p0,i)).
3. Dollar Margin Maintenance: A policy under which the regular retail price after the
wholesale price change is set so as to maintain the dollar margin in place before the
wholesale price change. Formally, p1,i = p0,i+(c1,i  c0,i).
4. Minimum Percentage Margin Maintenance: A hybrid policy under which Price Main-
tenance is followed for wholesale price decreases and Percentage Margin Maintenance
is followed for wholesale price increases. Formally, p1,i = 1(c1,i < c0,i) · p0,i + 1(c1,i >
c0,i) · p0,i c1,ic0,i
5. Minimum Dollar Margin Maintenance: A hybrid policy under which Price Maintenance
is followed for wholesale price decreases and Dollar Margin Maintenance is followed
for wholesale price increases. Formally, p1,i = p0,i+1(c1,i > c0,i) · (c1,i  c0,i).
As can be seen in Table 3, these heuristics generally fare poorly relative to our asymmet-
ric two-stage models. A notable exception, however, is the minimum percentage margin
maintenance heuristic which is quite competitive in terms of MAE. We believe this heuris-
tic is particularly accurate for small to moderate wholesale price changes and but much
less accurate for large wholesale price changes; this combined with the fact that RMSE is
more sensitive to large errors than MAE helps explain the discrepant performance of this
heuristic in terms of these two metrics. We note the perfect Zero% achieved by the price
maintenance heuristic is by definition and is thus trivial.
To further examine model performance, we compare in Table 4 our various models
specifications and heuristics on an important subset of the data, namely wholesale price
increases followed by regular retail price increases which account for 51.7% of the data.
While the most flexible asymmetric two-stage model still performs the best, the various
model specifications di↵er little with respect to all but the average width metric. This is
not unsurprising: by conditioning on wholesale price increases followed by regular retail
price increases, this subset of the data is necessarily “one-stage” and “symmetric”; fur-
ther, empirically it is roughly linear as indicated by the dashed curve in Figure 2. The
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Stages Assymetry fPrice ,j,k
Out-of-Sample
RMSE MAE Cov% Avg. Width
One No Restricted Linear 0.49 0.15 99 3.66
One No Linear 0.47 0.16 99 3.62
One No Response Surface 0.55 0.16 99 3.34
One Yes Restricted Linear 0.50 0.16 97 2.35
One Yes Linear 0.49 0.14 97 2.31
One Yes Response Surface 0.45 0.14 97 2.14
Two No Restricted Linear 0.41 0.16 97 1.61
Two No Linear 0.41 0.14 98 1.59
Two No Response Surface 0.40 0.14 98 1.56
Two Yes Restricted Linear 0.48 0.15 98 1.48
Two Yes Linear 0.45 0.14 98 1.42
Two Yes Response Surface 0.40 0.14 98 1.42
Price Maintenance 1.06 0.50 NA NA
Percentage Margin Maintenance 0.51 0.09 NA NA
Dollar Margin Maintenance 0.51 0.22 NA NA
Table 4: Model Evaluation Metrics for Various Model Specifications Conditional on a Wholesale Price Increase Followed by
a Regular Retail Price Increase. RMSE denotes root mean square error, MAE median absolute error, Cov% the coverage
percentage of the 95% predictive intervals, and Avg. Width the average width of the 95% predictive intervals. Minimum Per-
centage (Dollar) Margin Maintenance is equivalent to Percentage (Dollar) Margin Maintenance conditioning on a wholesale
price increase followed by a regular retail price increase so it is omitted from the table. The model specifications generally
perform similarly except in terms of Avg. Width because this subset of the data is necessarily “one-stage” and “symmetric.”
The Percentage Margin Maintenance heuristic (which is equivalent to minimum percentage margin maintenance for this
subset of the data) is competitive in terms of RMSE and has the best MAE.
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performance of the managerial heuristics is much more interesting. Unsurprisingly, the
price maintenance policy performs quite poorly. However, percentage margin maintenance
(which is equivalent to minimum percentage margin maintenance for this subset of the
data) is competitive in terms of RMSE and has the best MAE suggesting that percent-
age margin maintenance (i.e., the monopoly mark-up pricing rule) provides a reasonable
description of this large subset of the data. Dollar margin maintenance (which is equiva-
lent to minimum dollar margin maintenance for this subset of the data) is not particularly
competitive in terms of either RMSE or MAE.
As an additional consideration, we performed an additional series of model fits, refitting
our full suite of model specifications but replacing c0,i, c1,i, p0,i, and p1,i with their natural
logarithms. Again, the two-stage, asymmetric, response surface model was the best per-
forming model. Further, di↵erences in interpretation of results between this logarithmic
model and the original model were comparatively minor so we proceed with results from
the original model.
As a final consideration, beyond linking the two stages of our model via the conditional-
ity of the second stage on the first stage and via the joint prior on the respective elements
of  Departmentd and  
T ime
t , we also sought to link them by allowing for non-zero covariance
among the error terms implicit in the model specification. Interval estimates of such covari-
ances both overlapped zero and were relatively narrow thereby supporting the assumption
of zero covariance made in our original model specification.
5.2. Pass-through Elasticity
While our principal coe cient estimates appear in Appendix B, we devote this section to
discussion of the most salient and important results. In particular, we discuss the e↵ect
of changes in wholesale prices on the direction and magnitude of changes in regular retail
prices. We also highlight the importance of our most impactful covariates as well as depart-
ment heterogeneity.
We illustrate our findings via Figures 5-7, which all have three panels. In the top panel
of each figure, we show results from the first stage of the model; the x-axis gives the
percentage change in the wholesale price while the y-axis gives the probability of a regular
retail price change. Recall that there are three possible events for any wholesale price
change: no change in regular retail price, a regular retail price increase, and a regular
retail price decrease. We plot the probability of each of these three events for wholesale
Author: Decision Stages and Asymmetries in Regular Retail Price Pass-through
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price changes ranging from  10% to +10% and note that empirically 74% of the observed
wholesale price changes lie in this range. In the second panel of each figure, we show results
from the second stage of the model; the x-axis again gives the percentage change in the
wholesale price while the y-axis gives the percentage change in the regular retail price,
conditional on the direction of the change in regular retail price. Finally, in the third panel
of each figure, we show results that aggregate across both stages of our model thus giving
the overall e↵ect of whether and how much is passed through; the axes are as in the second
panel but are not conditional on the direction of the change in regular retail price.
To obtain the results presented in each panel of the figures, we use our model to com-
pute, conditional on a given change in the wholesale price, an average (i) probability for
the change in direction of the regular retail price, (ii) magnitude of the change of the reg-
ular retail price conditional on the direction, and (iii) overall change averaging both over
direction and magnitude. In particular, for event i and posterior draw j, we can calculate
pc1i,j which gives the probability of each of the three outcomes (i.e., increase, decrease, or
no change in regular retail price) given a change in wholesale price implied by setting the
new wholesale price equal to c1 (i.e., by using c1 in place of c1,i and s
c1
i = sgn(c1   c0,i)
in place of sci). We can then draw s
p,c1,?
i,j ⇠Multinomial(1,pc1i,j). Similarly, we can use c1 in
place of c1,i, s
c1
i in place of s
c
i , and s
p,c1,?
i,j in place of s
p
i to calculate µ
c1
i,j and then draw
pc1,?1,i,j ⇠TruncatedNormal(µc1i,j, 2sc1i ,sp,c1,?i,j |l
c1
i,j, u
c1
i,j) where l
c1
i,j and u
c1
i,j are defined as described
in Section 4. In order to make wholesale price comparisons comparable across di↵erent
SKUs, we successively set c1 proportional to c0. Finally, we obtain results by computing
various functions of the sp,c1,?i and p
c1,?
1,i,j and summarizing them over posterior draws j by
computing quantiles.
We begin by examining the direction of the regular retail price change conditional on the
change in wholesale price implied by c1. In particular, for each j, we calculate the fraction
of sp,c1,?i equal to  1, 0, and 1 respectively and then take quantiles over j. We show such
results in the top panel of Figure 5. For wholesale price decreases, we estimate that there
is an 80% chance of no pass-through and that this probability is relatively invariant to the
size of the wholesale price decrease. On the other hand, for even nominal wholesale price
increases, there is a 60% chance of a regular retail price increase and this probability rises
with the size of the wholesale price increase. In sum, the probability of the direction of the
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Figure 5 Model Estimate of the Average E↵ect of Wholesale Price Changes. Posterior predictive medians are
given by the points and 50% and 95% posterior predictive intervals are given by the thick and thin lines
respectively. The top panel plots the probability of the direction of the change in the regular retail price,
the middle panel plots the percentage change in the regular retail price conditional on the direction
of the change, and the bottom panel plots the overall average change in the regular retail price. The
probability of the direction of the change in the regular retail price shows an asymmetric response
to wholesale price increases versus decreases while the magnitude of the change in the regular retail
price conditional on the direction of the change does not; overall, there is an asymmetric response.
The line labeled 1S (1A) in the bottom plot gives the estimated price response from the one-stage,
symmetric (asymmetric), non-hierarchical restricted linear model common in the literature; it provides
a substantially di↵erent estimate particularly for wholesale price decreases.
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change in regular retail price shows an asymmetric response to wholesale price increases
versus decreases.
We next examine the magnitude of regular retail price changes conditional on their direc-
tion. In particular, for each j, we select the observations with sp,c1,?i = k for k 2 { 1,0,1},
compute the proportional regular retail price change
(p
c1,?
1,i,j p0,i)
p0,i
, and take quantiles over j.
We show such results in the middle panel of Figure 5. Again, for wholesale price decreases,
when regular retail prices are also decreased (which occurs only about 10% of the time as
per the top panel of the figure), they are decreased roughly 35% and this decrease is rela-
tively insensitive to the size of the wholesale price decrease. For wholesale price increases,
when regular retail prices are also increased (which occurs over 60% of the time as per
the top panel of the figure), they are increased by about 10% for nominal wholesale price
increases and this percentage rises with the size of the wholesale price increase. Due to the
large standard errors associated with (i) regular retail price increases following wholesale
price decreases and (ii) regular retail price decreases following wholesale price increases
(note, there is little data in these regions as shown in Table 2), we conclude that the mag-
nitude of the change in regular retail price conditional on the direction of the change does
not show an asymmetric response to wholesale price increases versus decreases.
Finally, we examine what happens overall by looking at
(p
c1,?
1,i,j p0,i)
p0,i
unconditional on sp,c1,?i
and taking quantiles over j. We show such results in the bottom panel of Figure 5. In
sum, wholesale price decreases are followed by a roughly 2% decrease in regular retail price
and this decrease is relatively insensitive to the size of the wholesale price increase while
even nominal wholesale price increases are followed by a 6% increase in regular retail price
and this percentage rises with the size of the wholesale price increase. The average change
in regular retail price shows an asymmetric response to wholesale price increases versus
decreases, and, putting all three panels together, this asymmetry appears to be driven by
the first stage of the decision-making process.
In order to compare our model results to those of models more typical in the literature,
we fit a one-stage, symmetric, non-hierarchical restricted linear model as described above.
As this model has only one stage, it can only appear in the bottom panel of Figure 5.
The fact that wholesale price increases followed by regular retail price increases dominate
the dataset (they are over half of all observations and indicated by Table 2) makes this
model severely biased upwards for wholesale price decreases: it predicts an increase in
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regular retail price even for a large wholesale price decrease. On the other hand, it performs
relatively similarly to our model for wholesale price increases. In sum, this relatively simple
model cannot accommodate the complex patterns demonstrated in Section 3 (and, in
particular, in Table 2 and Figure 2). We also generalized this model to allow for asymmetry,
but this did not substantially improve model fit or add new insights.
Another strategy that is common in the literature is to model the natural logarithm of
the regular retail price as a linear function of the natural logarithm of the wholesale price
(Besanko et al. 2005). Because our data allows us to fit richer models we do not fit this
model. Further, the bottom panel Figure 5 reveals that the log-linear would be inadequate
because it implies a constant pass-through elasticity whereas the elasticity in the figure
is indeed very non-constant. We note that a constant pass-through elasticity is similar to
what is actually estimated by the one-stage, symmetric, non-hierarchical restricted linear
model in Figure 6.
In addition to the overall assessment discussed above, we also investigated the impact of
our various covariates on regular retail price pass-through. Our most impactful covariates
were (i) the binary covariate indicating whether SKUi is private label or national brand,
(ii) the binary covariate indicating whether or not p0,i ends in ninety-nine cents, and (iii)
the time since the last wholesale price change for SKUi. We discuss the impact of these
covariates beginning with the former. The impact of private label versus national brand
SKUs is shown in Figure 6 which generates estimates using the same procedure as Figure
5 but setting each private label indicator to zero and one respectively. As can be seen,
private label SKUs are more likely than national brands to have no change in the regular
retail price following a change in the wholesale price (top panel of Figure 6). Nonetheless,
private label and national brand SKUs do not di↵er in terms of the magnitude of the
change in the regular retail price conditional on the direction of the change (middle panel
of Figure 6). The two features aggregate together to yield lower overall pass-though for
private label SKUs (bottom panel of Figure 6).
This finding is interesting in light of prior work which has found that retailers are more
likely to pass through price promotions for private label products (Ailawadi and Harlam
2009). Together, these results suggest that the retailer is quite sensitive to the price of
private label products. Since the majority of our events are wholesale price increases, less
frequent regular price pass-through leads to lower regular prices for private label items.
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Figure 6 Model Estimate of the Average E↵ect of Wholesale Price Changes for Private Label and National
Brands. For interpretation, see the caption for Figure 5. Private label SKUs are more likely than national
brands to have no change in the regular retail price following a change in the wholesale price, but
private label and national brand SKUs do not di↵er in terms of the magnitude of the change in the
regular retail price conditional on the direction of the change; consequently, private label SKUs have
lower overall pass-through. The principal estimates from Figure 5 are provided in gray for purposes of
comparison.
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But, a high promotional pass-through would lead to deep discounts on these items. This
paints a picture of the retailer focusing on both low regular prices and deep discounts for
private label items.
The binary ninety-nine cent ending covariate had an impact similar to the binary private
label covariate. SKUs with ninety-nine cent price endings were less likely to have a change
in regular retail price followed by a change in wholesale price (as in Anderson et al. (2015;
forthcoming)), but the magnitude of the change in regular retail price conditional on the
direction of the change did not vary depending on whether or not the price ended in
ninety-nine cents. Thus, the plot for the binary ninety-cent ending covariate (not shown)
looks very similar to Figure 6 although the magnitude of the di↵erences in the top and
bottom panels is somewhat attenuated. This finding reflects price ending preservation, an
important real-world pricing practice (Anderson and Simester 2003).
We present the impact of the time since the last wholesale price change for a given SKU
in Figure 7. We generate estimates using the same procedure as Figure 5 by respectively
adding and subtracting one standard deviation to each time since the last wholesale price
change. SKUs that have not had a wholesale price change in a comparably long time are
more likely to have a regular retail price increase (decrease) following a wholesale price
price increase (decrease), a finding that makes a great deal of intuitive sense (top panel
of Figure 7). Nonetheless, there is no e↵ect for the magnitude of the change in regular
retail price conditional on the direction of the change (middle panel of Figure 7). These
two features aggregate together to yield higher overall pass-though for SKUs that have not
had a wholesale price change in a comparably long time (bottom panel of Figure 7).
We also investigated the e↵ect of department heterogeneity as captured by the  Departmentd
and temporal heterogeneity as captured by the  T imet and the number of same week whole-
sale price changes covariate. As suggested by Figure 4, patterns of pass-through vary
considerably across departments and this variation, unlike the impact of covariates, is not
limited to the first stage of the model: the various departments di↵er in terms of both the
likelihood and magnitude of pass-through in response to both wholesale price increases
and decreases. In contrast, managers’ pass-through decisions did not vary all that much
at least over the four-year period of our data. This result is interesting given the debate
on the cyclicality of markup in macroeconomics (Bils 1987, Nekarda and Ramey 2010,
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Figure 7 Model Estimate of the Average E↵ect of Wholesale Price Changes by Time Since Last Wholesale Price
Change. For interpretation, see the caption for Figure 5. When the most recent wholesale price change
prior to the current one is large, regular retail prices are more likely to be adjusted upward (downward)
following an increase (decrease) in the wholesale price but there is no di↵erence for the magnitude
of the change in the regular retail price conditional on the direction of the change; consequently,
SKUs with wholesale prices that have not been recently changed have higher overall pass-through. The
principal estimates from Figure 5 are provided in gray for purposes of comparison.
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Eichenbaum et al. 2011). Our finding contributes to this literature by suggesting that pass-
through decision behavior is relatively stable despite the macroeconomic fluctuations in
evidence during our four-year period.
One potential concern with the results presented above is that the retailer limits the
number of price adjustments to one hundred per day Anderson et al. (2015; forthcom-
ing). To investigate the extent to which our findings are influenced by this constraint, we
repeated our analysis but omitting weeks in the top decile of number of cost changes from
our dataset; reassuringly, there was no substantive di↵erence in the results.
5.3. Explaining the Empirical Findings
In this subsection, we relate our empirical findings to various theoretical models of price
adjustment. When faced with a change in marginal cost, single-state economic models
predict that there should always be a price adjustment and that the adjustment should be
proportional in magnitude to the cost change. Our data clearly reject these models on two
grounds: (i) we find that non-response is common and (ii) we find considerable asymmetry
in response with respect to the direction of the cost shocks. These two empirical facts are
inconsistent with this class of economic models.
In contrast, menu cost models are broadly consistent with several empirical facts. In
particular, non-response to cost shocks is a key feature of these models. If managers also
have expectations that future cost increases are more likely than future cost decreases,
then these models also predict asymmetry in whether to respond to a cost shock.
A limitation of menu cost models is that they are largely silent on the magnitude of
price response. Here, menu cost models typically revert to a one-stage model where the
magnitude of price adjustment is dictated by demand elasticity, the size of the cost change,
competitive prices, product line considerations, and many other factors. While these factors
may clearly play a role in price adjustment, we believe that managerial heuristics also play
an important role. When we consider only wholesale price increases that are followed by
regular retail price increases, we showed that the percentage margin maintenance heuristic
is a reasonably good predictor of the magnitude of price adjustment. When we consider
the entire dataset, we find that the minimum percentage margin maintenance heuristic is
a good predictor of both non-response and the magnitude of response.
An alternative explanation for our findings, which was o↵ered by the review team, is
driven by consumer attention. Retailers may want to make infrequent, large regular retail
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price decreases so that consumers notice the price change. In contrast, regular retail price
increases may be masked via frequent, small adjustments. While this theory is plausible,
it o↵ers only a partial explanation of the data. For example, it is true that we observe
infrequent regular retail price decreases and that when they occur they tend to be large;
this fits the attention theory well. However, we do not observe frequent, small regular
retail price increases. Indeed, if anything, we see the opposite: when a regular retail price
increase occurs, there is a discrete jump in price and then a linear relationship with the
size of the wholesale price increase. The attention theory fails to explain these empirical
patterns that represent the bulk of our data.
An additional explanation suggested by the review team is that the patterns we observe
could be driven by the retailer utilizing a dynamic strategy. For example, a retailer may
not pass through a current wholesale price decrease if a future wholesale price increase is
expected. This dynamic theory could explain the non-response to wholesale price decreases.
Similarly, a retailer may not pass through a small wholesale price increase today but then
take a larger price adjustment on a subsequent wholesale price increase. This dynamic
theory could explain pass-through rates that exceed 100%.
We readily concede that these dynamic theories are plausible. However, we are unable
to investigate them with our data. First, we have no measures of managers’ future price
expectations though we speculate that these expectations are likely to play at least some
role in explaining the non-response to wholesale price decreases. Second, while our data
span every wholesale price change in the entire store over four years, there are very few
items with numerous wholesale price changes (recall the median (mean) number of days
between wholesale price changes is 478 (746)). If managers are employing a dynamic adjust-
ment strategy in this setting, then the dynamics must extend beyond the four-year horizon
of our data. Given the institutional memory of most firms, we speculate that dynamic
adjustments are unlikely for this firm but may apply in other contexts.
When considering the full set of explanations for these findings, we believe that no single
theory is adequate. This suggests an opportunity for future researchers to develop a new
theoretical model that can capture our key empirical findings. Importantly, a theory of
regular retail price adjustment may need to be distinct from theories of temporary price
adjustments.
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General Finding Empirical Fact From This Study
The decision regarding whether to pass a whole-
sale price change through to the regular retail price
is asymmetric with respect to the direction of the
wholesale price change.
70% (9%) of wholesale price increases (decreases)
result in a regular retail price increase (decrease).
The decision regarding whether to pass a wholesale
price change through to the regular retail price is
moderated by:
(i) Whether or not a product is private label.
(ii) Whether or not it has a ninety-nine cent price
ending.
(iii) The amount of time since the product’s last
wholesale price change.
(i) Private label products are 12% (13%) more likely
to have no change in regular retail price following a
wholesale price increase (decrease).
(ii) Products with a regular retail price that ends in
ninety-nine cent are 7% (5%) more likely to have no
change in regular retail price following a wholesale
price increase (decrease).
(iii) A one standard deviation increase in the time
since the last wholesale price change is associated
with a -4% (0%) change in the likelihood of no
change in regular retail price following a wholesale
price increase (decrease).
The decision regarding how much to pass a whole-
sale price change through to the regular retail price
is asymmetric with respect to the direction of the
wholesale price change.
Regular retail price increases (increases) are approx-
imately linear (flat) with respect to the wholesale
price increase (decrease).
Small regular retail price adjustments are rare. Less than 3% of all regular retail price changes are
less than or equal to ten cents. Less than 19% of all
regular retail price changes are less than or equal to
5% of the original retail price.
Regular retail price pass-through is typically larger
than 100%
96% (81%) of regular retail price increase
(decreases) events have pass through greater than
100%.
Wholesale price increases are more frequent than
wholesale price decreases.
There are 2.8 times as many wholesale price
increases as decreases (2.5, 2.4, 7.4, and 1.3 and for
each year 2006 - 2009 respectively.).
Wholesale price changes are infrequent. The median (mean) number of days between whole-
sale price changes is 478 (746).
The majority of store revenue is earned at the reg-
ular retail price.
75% of store revenue is earned at the regular retail
price.
Table 5 Summary of Findings.
5.4. Summary of Empirical Findings
A summary of our findings is presented in Table 5. Each row of the table gives a general
finding about regular retail price pass-through as well as an empirical fact from this study.
A potential concern with any empirical study is the extent to which the results generalize
to other settings. While our study is limited in that we consider only a single large retail
chain, it is extensive in that we cover every regular retail price change across a broad set
of products (i.e., the entire store) over a long time horizon (i.e., four years). This extensive
coverage across products and time is rarely seen in empirical studies of pass-through.
Consequently, we believe that our results are thus comparably quite generalizable.
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6. Discussion
We have built a flexible two-stage asymmetric statistical model to characterize how man-
agers adjust the regular retail price in response to a wholesale price change. We show
that our model performs better relative to both restricted versions of it (i.e., one-stage
or symmetric models) as well various managerial heuristics that reflect at least in part
theoretical considerations (e.g., menu costs, monopoly mark-up). The strong performance
of our model suggests important implications for both academic research and management
practice.
For academics, one of the key insights is that regular retail price pass-through is best
characterized by a two-stage process. In the first stage, one must consider whether to make
a retail price change. In the second stage, one must consider how much to change the retail
price. This contradicts with the standard approach in marketing and economics, which
has characterized the managerial decision as a single stage model in which pass-through is
measured as a single derivative. This type of model does not capture some of the salient
features of managerial behavior. For example, small price changes are rarely observed in our
data. If a manager changes the price, then the price change is likely to be substantial even if
the wholesale price change is small. This type of behavior is consistent with macroeconomic
models that include menu costs. Our results suggest a need to incorporate features of these
models in order to more accurately capture how managers make decisions.
A second result that is of importance to academics is that regular retail price pass-
through is highly asymmetric. When there are wholesale price increases, managers are
substantially more likely to increase the regular retail price. But, when there are wholesale
price decreases, managers are more likely to pocket the additional margin and leave regular
retail prices unchanged. While these asymmetries have been found in other industries, such
as gasoline, they have not been found in frequently-purchased consumer packaged goods.
Again, we have few theories that can account for this type of asymmetry in price pass-
through, and, thus, models such as those of Tyagi (1999) and Moorthy (2005) need to be
extended to incorporate this type of asymmetry.
Manufacturers that we have worked with indicate that they exert considerable e↵ort
forecasting how a retailer will respond to a wholesale price change. Our results suggest
that whether to respond is asymmetric and depends on whether the wholesale price change
is an increase or decrease. But, conditional on a retailer responding to a wholesale price
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increase, the regular retail price increase is approximately linear. Combining this with
our observation that managers tend to maintain retail price margins, one can develop a
reasonably good model of how a retailer is likely to respond to a wholesale price increase.
For wholesale price decreases, a surprise is that prices are relatively sticky and invariant
to the magnitude of the decrease. This suggests that manufacturers may want to pursue
levers other than wholesale price for reducing the regular retail price.
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Appendix A: Priors and Sampling
The priors used for the model of Section 4 are, simply put, standard non-informative ones. We provide full
details of our prior specification and sampling strategy below.
Our priors for the intercept terms ↵Interceptsci ,k and  
Intercept
sci ,s
p
i
are
↵Interceptsci ,k ⇠Normal(0,100
2) ,  Intercept
sci ,s
p
i
⇠Normal(0,1002)
where sci , s
p
i , k 2 { 1,1}. As mentioned in Section 4, the prior for our heterogeneous department-specific and
time-specific terms  Departmentd and  
Time
t are
 Departmentd ⇠MultivariateNormal(0,⌃Department) ,  Timet ⇠MultivariateNormal(0,⌃Time).
We let ⌃Department and ⌃Time be arbitrary matrices thus implying a joint prior on the respective elements
of  Departmentd and  
Time
t ; this requires a prior for ⌃
Department and ⌃Time and we use the standard
⌃Department ⇠ InverseWishart(10 · I8,8) , ⌃Time ⇠ InverseWishart(10 · I8,8)
where I8 is the eight-dimensional identity matrix. Under this final specification, the two stages of our model
are linked not only by the fact that the second stage is conditional on the first stage but also through the
joint prior on respective elements of  Departmentd and  
Time
t .
For each ↵xsci ,k and  
x
sci ,s
p
i
where sci , s
p
i , k 2 { 1,1} and x 2 {Price,Covariate}, we use the same prior as
the intercept, namely
↵xsci ,k,p ⇠Normal(0,100
2) ,  xsci ,s
p
i ,p
⇠Normal(0,1002)
where p indexes the components of ↵xsci ,k and  
x
sci ,s
p
i
. Finally, our prior for the standard deviations of the
truncated normal distributions in stage two of our model is
 sci ,s
p
i
⇠Uniform(0,100)
for sci , s
p
i 2 { 1,1}.
We sample from the full posterior distribution using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (Chib and Greenberg
1995, Gelfand 1996, Gelman et al. 2003). We implement the MCMC algorithm in WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter
et al. 1999) running four independent chains each for 80,000 iterations, discarding the first 30,000 as burn-in,
and thinning every 200 iterations. Convergence was assessed via the Gelman-Rubin Rˆ statistic (Gelman and
Rubin 1992).
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Appendix B: Coe cient Estimates
Coe cient
↵ 1, 1 ↵1,1   1, 1  1,1
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Intercept -2.56 1.68 -0.91 1.33 -2.70 2.01 0.88 0.94
p0 0.04 0.05 -0.24 0.03 0.62 0.07 1.04 0.00
c0 0.55 0.13 -0.96 0.19 -0.68 0.16 -1.36 0.03
c1 -0.60 0.12 1.34 0.18 1.22 0.13 1.31 0.03
p20 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
c20 -0.03 0.01 -0.13 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.01
c21 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00
p0c0 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
p0c1 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00
c0c1 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.01
Private Label -3.02 0.34 -0.81 0.10 1.82 0.56 0.04 0.02
Ninety-nine Cent Ending -0.39 0.22 -0.48 0.06 0.07 0.31 0.06 0.01
Market Share -2.13 1.39 -0.97 0.51 5.29 1.90 -0.17 0.11
Promotion Frequency 0.01 0.39 -0.10 0.16 0.27 0.51 0.02 0.03
Promotion Depth -0.14 0.40 -0.11 0.13 0.20 0.56 0.07 0.02
Shelf Time -0.33 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.14 -0.00 0.01
Time Since Last
0.19 0.08 0.24 0.03 0.24 0.12 0.01 0.01
Wholesale Price Change
Proliferation 0.22 0.23 -0.06 0.22 0.05 0.23 -0.09 0.17
Revenue 0.14 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.00
Number of Same Week
-0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.24 -0.00 0.03
Wholesale Price Changes
Posterior Means and Standard Deviations of Coe cients. Most coe cients pertaining to wholesale and
regular retail prices attain statistically significance thus suggesting the importance of the flexible response
surface. Most coe cients pertaining to our ten covariates, in contrast, fail to attain statistical significance
thus suggesting that pass-through decisions are more strongly related to wholesale and regular retail prices.
For simplicity, coe cients for which the direction of the change in the wholesale and regular retail price do
not match are omitted.
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